The exploration-exploitation dilemma is a fundamental but intractable problem in the learning and decision sciences. In this problem the goal of exploration and exploitation is to maximize reward. Here we challenge this basic form. We conjecture the dilemma can be viewed as a competition between exploiting known rewards or exploring to learn a world model, a simplified concept of memory borrowed from computer science. We prove this competition is tractable and can be solved by a simple greedy algorithm. This solution has the properties expected of an optimal solution to original dilemmafinding maximum value with no regret.
Introduction
Let's imagine a bee foraging in a meadow. Our bee has a decision to make. It could go back to the location of a flower it has visited before (exploitation) or go somewhere else (exploration). In a traditional reinforcement learning account when our bee explores it acts to maximize tangible rewards (1) , such as finding a plant with more flowers (Figure 1,  A) . This reinforcement learning account however leads to a mathematically intractable dilemma over whether it is optimal to explore or exploit a any given moment (2) (3) (4) (5) .
Resource gathering is not the only reason animals explore. Many animals, like our bee, learn simplified models of the world to make decisions and plan actions (6, 7) . Borrowing from the field of artificial intelligence we refer to these as world models (1, 8, 9) . When learning a world model, information about the environment is intrinsically valuable and is why animals are intrinsically curious (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) and prone to explore even when no rewards are present or expected (16) . In some cases information seeking is known to happen even if it explicitly leads to a loss of reward (17) .
Here we conjecture that the only kind of exploratory behavior an animal needs to do is that which builds its world model. With this conjecture we can propose an alternative to the classic dilemma, breaking exploration and exploitation into independent objectives that compete to either exploit known rewards or explore to learn a world model ( Figure 1B) . We prove this alternative has a tractable and optimal solution. Optimal here means maximising rewards while minimizing regrets.
Our contribution is threefold. We offer five axioms that serve as a general basis to estimate the value of any learned observation, given a memory. This prospective leads to a surprising result. Information theory can be formally disconnected from information value, producing a new universal theory. Next we prove that the computer science method of dynamic programming (1, 18) provides an optimal way to maximize this kind of information value. Finally, we describe a simple greedy scheduling algorithm that can maximize both information value and reward. The classic dilemma is depicted as two options for reward maximization: exploit an action with a known reward likelihood (e.g., return to the previous plant) or stochastically explore other actions on the chance they return better outcomes (e.g., find a plant with more flowers). B.
Here we offer an alternative view of the dilemma, with two different competitive goals: maximize rewards (e.g., keep returning to known flower locations) or build a model of the world by learning new information (e.g., layout of the environment). Notice how exploration here is based not on finding rewards per se (e.g., flowers), but on learning in general. Artist credit: Richard Grant.
Results
A definition of information value. Rewards and information are fundamentally distinct concepts. Rewards are a conserved resource. Information is not. For example if a rat shares potato chip with a cage-mate, she must necessarily split the chip up leaving less food for herself. Whereas if student shares the latest result from a scientific paper with a lab-mate, they do not necessarily forget a portion of that result.
To formally separate the value of information from the value of reward we look to the field of information theory (19) . Rather than focus on the statistical problem of transmitting symbols, as was Shannon's goal, we focus on remembering symbols, in order to produce a learning and memory view of information value.
World models are memories that range from simple novelty signals (20) , to location or state counts (21, 22) , state and action prediction (9, 15, 23) , flow (24) , learning progress (25) , classic working or episodic memories (26, 27) , Bayesian and hierarchical Bayesian models (23, (28) (29) (30) , latent spaces (31) and recurrent neural networks (32) (33) (34) (35) . In all of these examples, the value of any observation made by an agent who is learning a world model depends entirely on what the agent learns by making that observation.
We do not prefer any one kind of world model to any other. So we adopt a broad definition of memory, which overlaps with nearly any world model. We assume that time t is continuous quantity, and denote increases in time using the differential The authors have no conflicts of interest to declare. T quantity dt. We generally then express changes in M (our memory, defined below) as a differential equation (e.g., dM dt ), although for non-differential memories difference equations can be used (e.g., ∆M ∆t ). Observations about the environment s are real numbers sampled from a finite state space s ∈ S, whose size is N (denoted S N ). Actions are also real numbers a drawn from a finite space A K . Rewards Rt, when they appear, are generally binary and always provided by the external environment.
Preliminaries aside, we can formally define a memory M as a finite set of real numbers, whose maximum size is also N (M N ). We say that learning of s at time t by M happens by an invertible encoder function f , M t+dt = f (Mt, st) and Mt = f −1 (M t+dt , st). (Invertibility here is equivalent to saying that any observations which be stored can be forgotten). Memorieŝ st about st are recalled by a decoder function g, such that st = g (Mt, st) .
The details of f and g define what kind of world model M is. To make this more concrete, let's consider some examples. If f simply adds states to the memory and g tests whether st is in M , then M models novelty (20) . If f counts states and g returns those counts, then M is a count-based heuristic (21, 22 ). If f follows Bayes rule and g decodes the probability of st, then we have recovered a classic frequently used information theory account of information value (23, 29, 30) . In this account the decoded state probabilities could be the current state, or for future states or actions (9, 15, 23) . Or if M is much smaller than the size of the space S N , then f could learn a latent or compressed representation (28, 31, (33) (34) (35) (36) (37) (38) , with g decoding a reconstruction of current (ŝt) or future states (ŝ t+dt ).
We define a real valued distance E to measure how M changes with both time and observations. Different f and g pairs will naturally need different ways to exactly express this distance. For example, a novelty model (20) would produce binary values, as would a count model (21, 22) . A latent memory (9, 15) might use its own error gradient. A probabilistic memory (23, 28) would likely use the KL divergence. All that matters is the chosen distance meet our five axioms. (39, 40) . It also ensures that an observation that leads to a simplifying or parsimonious insight (is equivalent to a compression of the memory, (36) ) is more valuable than one that changes memory the same total amount but does not lead to compression. Technically speaking by learnable we mean learnable using the probably approximately correct (PAC) framework (41), a common tool of computer science used to formalize learning and inference. Any observation that cannot be learned, for whatever the reason, is not valuable because it cannot change behavior.
Axiom 1 (Axiom of Memory
Having written down a positive definition, for clarity we'll also state what our theory is not. Information value is not based on the intrinsic complexity of an observation (that is, its entropy) (42) , nor on its similarity to the environment (its mutual information; (43) ), nor on its novelty or surprise (3, 23, 29) .
Stimulus complexity and surprise have tremendous potential to drive learning, of course. In cases like Bayesian rule there is even a fixed relationship between learning and surprise (23, 29, 44) . However, this does not hold for all learning rules. Complexity and surprise which can't be learned is not valuable; if it can't be learned it can't shape future actions.
Exploration as a dynamic programming problem. Dynamic programming is a popular optimization approach because it can guarantee total value is maximized by a simple, deterministic, and greedy algorithm. In Theorem 1 (see Mathematical Appendix) we prove our definition of memory has one critical property, optimal substructure, that is needed for a greedy dynamic programming solution (18, 45) . The other two needed properties, E ≥ 0 and the Markov property (18, 45) , are fulfilled by the Axioms 3 and 1 respectively.
To write down dynamic programming (or Bellman) solution for E we must introduce a little more notation. We let π denote the action policy, a function that takes a state s and returns an action a. We let δ be a transition function that takes a state-action pair (st, at) and returns a new state, s t+dt . For notational simplicity we also redefine E as F (Mt, at), and call this the payoff function (18) . 
The value function for F is,
And the recursive Bellman solution to learn this value function is,
For the full derivation see the Mathematical Appendix. Eq. 3 implies that the optimal action policy π * E for E (and F ) is a simple greedy policy. This greedy policy ensures that exploration of any finite space S is exhaustive (Theorems 2 and 3 in Mathematical Appendix).
Axiom 5 requires that learning in M converge. Axiom 4 requires information value increases with surprise, re-scaled by specificity. When combined with a greedy action policy like P R E P R I N T π * E , these axioms naturally lead to active learning (14, 46, 47) and to adversarial curiosity (48) .
Scheduling a way around the dilemma. Remember that the goal of reinforcement learning is to maximize reward, an objective approximated by the value function VR(s) and an action policy πR.
To find an algorithm that maximizes both information and reward value we imagine the policies for exploration and exploitation acting as two possible "jobs" competing to control behavior. For exploration and exploitation we know (by definition) each of these jobs produces non-negative values which an optimal job scheduler could use: E for information or R for reward/reinforcement learning. Finding an optimal scheduler turns out to require we further simplify our assumptions.
We assume we are in a typical reinforcement learning setting, which is where the dilemma finds its simplest expression anyway. In this setting rewards are either present or absent (0, 1). Each action takes a constant amount of time and has no energetic cost. And each policy can only take one action at a time.
Most scheduling problems also assume that the value of a job is fixed, while in our problem information value changes as the memory learns and we expect that rewards are stochastic. However, in a general setting where one has no prior information about the environment the best predictor of the next future value is very often the last value (45, 49) . We assume this precept holds in all of our analysis.
The optimal solution to a scheduling problem with nonnegative values and fixed run times is a deterministic greedy algorithm (45) . We restate this solution as a set of inequalities where Rt and Et represent the value of reward and information at the last time-point.
To ensure that the default policy is reward maximization, Eq. 5 breaks ties between Rt and Et in favor of πR. In stochastic environments, M can show small continual fluctuations. To allow Eq. 5 to achieve a stable solution we introduce η, a boredom threshold for exploration. Larger values of η devalue exploration.
Reframing the exploration-exploitation dilemma as a scheduling problem comes at the cost of increasing overall computational complexity (41) . The worst case run time for ππ is linear and additive in its policies. That is, if in isolation it takes TE steps to earn ET = T E E, and TR steps to earn rT = T R R, then the worst case training time for ππ is TE + TR. This is only true if neither policy can learn from the other's actions. There is, however, no reason that each policy cannot observe the transitions (st, at, R, s t+dt ) caused by the other. If this is allowed, worst case training time improves to max(TE, TR).
Exploration without regret. Suboptimal exploration strategies will lead to a loss of potential rewards by wasting time on actions that have a lower expected value. Regret G measures the value loss caused by such exploration. G =V − Va, whereV represents the maximum value and Va represents the value found by taking an exploratory action rather than an exploitative one (1) .
Optimal strategies for a solution to the explorationexploitation dilemma should maximize total value with zero total regret. To evaluate dual value learning (Eq. 5) we compared total reward and regret across a range of both simple, and challenging multi-armed bandit tasks. Despite its apparent simplicity, the essential aspects of the exploration-exploitation dilemma P R E P R I N T Table 1 . Artificial agents.
Agent
Exploration mechanism Dual value Our algorithm (Eq 5).
E-greedy
With probability 1 − follow a greedy policy. With probability follow a random policy.
Annealed e-greedy Identical to E-greedy, but is decayed at fixed rate.
Bayesian reward
Use the KL divergence as a weighted intrinsic reward, sampling actions by a soft-max policy.
Action are selected with a random policy (no learning) exist in the multi-armed task (1) . Here the problem to be learned is the distribution of reward probabilities across arms ( Figure 2 ). To estimate the value of any observation st, we compare sequential changes in this probabilistic memory, M t+dt and Mt using the KL divergence (i.e. relative entropy; Figure 4A -B). The KL divergence is a standard way to measure the distance between two distributions (44) and is, by design, consistent with the axioms (see the Supplementary Materials for a more thorough discussion).
We start with a simple experiment with a single high value arm. The rest of the arms have a uniform reward probability (Bandit I). This represents a trivial problem. Next we tried a basic exploration test (Bandit II), with one winning arm and one distractor arm whose value is close to but less than the optimal choice. We then move on to a more difficult sparse exploration problem (Bandit III), where the world has a single winning arm, but the overall probability of receiving any reward is very low (p(R) = 0.02 for the winning arm, p(R) = 0.01 for all others). Sparse reward problems are notoriously difficult to solve, and are a common feature of both the real world and artificial environments like Go, chess, and class Atari video games (50) (51) (52) ). Finally, we tested a complex, large world exploration problem (Bandit (IV) with 121 arms, and a complex, randomly generated reward structure. Bandits of this type and size are near the limit of human performance (53) .
We compared the reward and regret performance of 6 artificial agents. All agents used the same temporal difference learning algorithm (TD(0), (1)); see Supplementary materials). The only difference between the agents was their exploration mechanism ( Table 1) . The e-greedy algorithm is a classic exploration mechanism (1). Its annealed variant is common in state-of-the-art reinforcement learning papers, like Mnih et al ( (50)). Other state-of-the-art exploration methods are models that treat Bayesian information gain as an intrinsic reward and the goal of all exploration is to maximize total reward (extrinsic plus intrinsic) (9, 54) . To provide a lower bound benchmark of performance we included an agent with a purely random exploration policy.
All of the classic and state-of-the-art algorithms performed well at the different tasks in terms of accumulation of rewards (right column, Figure 3 ). The one exception to this being the sparse low reward probability condition (Bandit III), where the dual value algorithm consistently returned more rewards than the other models. In contrast, most of the traditional models still had substantial amounts of regret in most of the tasks, with the exception of the annealed variant of the egreedy algorithm during the sparse, low reward probability task (left column, Figure 3 ). In contrast, the dual value learning algorithm consistently was able to maximize total reward with zero or near zero (Bandit III) regret, as would be expected by an optimal exploration policy.
Discussion
Past work. We are certainly not the first to quantify information value (43, 55) , or use that value to optimize reward learning (3, 9, 29, 56, 57) . Information value though is typically framed as a means to maximize the amount of tangible rewards (e.g., food, water, money) accrued over time (1) . This means information is treated as an analog of these tangible or external rewards. An intrinsic reward (9, 12, 23, 29) . This approximation does drive exploration in a practical and useful way, but doesn't change the intractability of the dilemma (2) (3) (4) (5) .
At the other extreme from reinforcement learning are pure exploration methods, like curiosity (15, 39, 54) or PAC approaches (41) . Curiosity learning is not generally known to converge on rewarding actions with certainty, but never-theless can be an effective heuristic (15, 58, 59) . Within some bounded error, PAC learning is certain to converge (41) . For example, to find the most rewarding arm in a bandit, and will do so with a bounded number of samples (60) . However, the number of samples is fixed and based on the size of the environment (but see (61, 62) ). So while PAC will give the right answer, eventually, its exploration strategy also guarantees high regret.
Animal behavior. In psychology and neuroscience, curiosity and reinforcement learning have developed as separate disciplines (1, 39, 40) . And indeed they are separate problems, with links to different basic needs-gathering resources to maintain physiological homeostasis (63, 64) and gathering information to plan for the future (1, 41) . Here we prove that though they are separate problems, they are problems that many ways they solve each other.
The theoretical description of exploration in scientific settings is probabilistic (5, (65) (66) (67) . By definition probabilistic models can't make exact predictions of behavior, only statistical ones. Our approach is deterministic, and so does make exact predictions. Our theory predicts it should be possible to guide exploration in real-time using, for example, optogenetic methods in neuroscience, or well timed stimulus manipulations in economics or other behavioral sciences.
Artificial intelligence. Progress in reinforcement learning and artificial intelligence research is limited by three factors: data efficiency, exploration efficiency, and transfer learning.
Data efficiency refers to how many samples or observations it takes to make a set amount of learning progress. The most successful reinforcement learning algorithms are highly data inefficient. For example, Q-learning (68) . To make reinforcement learning data inefficient generally requires one include a (world) model in the reinforcement algorithm itself. In the challenging environments modern methods must learn, it this model exists. A dual algorithm offers a good compromise. Exploration learns a world model. As this model improves it can be used directly by the reinforcement learning policy, potentially leading to substantial improvement in data efficiency.
P R E P R I N T
The specialist could think of this as a loose generalization of the successor model (6, 22, 69) .
In the large and complex environments modern machine learning operates in random exploration takes to long to be practical. So there is a critical need for more efficient exploration strategies (33) , often known as active sampling or directed exploration. A range of heuristics for exploration have been explored (13, 21, 42, (70) (71) (72) . Dual value algorithms offer a new and principled approach. Designing efficient exploration reduces to two questions: what should our agent remember? How should we measure change change in that memory? Subject to the axioms and Eq. 5, of course.
Deep reinforcement learning can match or exceed human performance in games like chess (52) , Go (51), as well as less structured games like classic Atari video games (68) . It It would be ideal to transfer performance from one task to another without (much) retraining (1). But with even minor changes to the environment, most artificial networks often cannot adapt (73, 74) . This is known as the transfer problem. One thing which limits transfer is that many networks are trained end-toend, which simultaneously (implicitly) learns a world model and a strategy for maximizing value. Disentangling these can improve transfer. We're therefore not the first to suggest using a world model for transfer (33, 75) . What we offer is a simple and optimal algorithm to combine nearly any world model with any reinforcement learning scheme.
Cost. It's not fair to talk about benefits without talking about costs. The worst-case run-time of a dual value algorithm is max(TE, TR), where TE and TR represent the time to learn to some criterion (see Results). In the unique setting where minimizing regret, maximizing data efficiency, exploration efficiency, and transfer do not matter, dual value learning can be a suboptimal choice.
Everyday life. Our most important contribution is perhaps a better worldview on a hard and common problem.
Q: Should we eat at our favorite, or try the new restaurant down the street? What if it's bad? A: I'm not sure. . . Even in a mundane setting like this question, and its dilemma, the potential loss from exploration is daunting and uncertain to think about. Well beyond the mundane, variations on this problem are universal appearing in psychology, neuroscience, biology, data science, artificial intelligence, game theory, economics, demography, and political science. Here we suggest an universal alternative.
The uncertainty of the unknown can always be recast as an opportunity to learn. But rather than being a trick of psychology, we prove this view is (in the narrow sense of our formalism anyway) mathematically optimal. Q: Would I rather have this reward, or learn something new? A: Which do I value more right now? Pick the biggest.
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Mathematical Appendix.
Compactness. The compactness C of a hyper-cube has a simple formula, C = P 2
A where P is the cube's perimeter and A is its area. Perimeter and area are of course defined by a set of distances D. Traditionally these would be euclidean distances, but any notion of distance should work.
To review, our world model M is simply a finite set of N real values. It therefore seems fair to assume one can always find, or define, a suitable axiomatic distance to measure how elements in M changed with time and learning, as Mt moves to M t+dt . This distance might be measured on the elements of M directly or, as a convenient proxy, using memories taken from M by the decoder function g (which we define in the main text).
With any set of distances D = {di, di+1, di+2, . . . dO} defined for all observed states Z ⊆ S, we can imagine they form a O-dimensional hyper-cube (O ≤ N ). By measuring this imagined cube we find a geometric estimate for compactness (Eq. 6). Compactness defined this way encompass both specific changes to, and compression of, the representation in M .
Information value as a dynamic programming problem. To find greedy dynamic programming (1, 45) answers we must prove our memory M has optimal substructure. By optimal substructure we mean that M can be partitioned into a small number, collection, or series of memories, each of which is itself a dynamic programming solution. In general by proving we can decompose some optimization problem into a small number of sub-problems whose optimal solution are known, or easy to prove, it becomes trivial to prove that we can also grow the series optimally. That is, proving optimal sub-structure nearly automatically allows for proof by induction (45) .
Theorem 1 (Optimal substructure). Assuming transition function δ is deterministic, if V *
π E is the optimal information value given by πE, a memory M t+dt has optimal substructure if the the last observation st can be removed from Mt, by at) is also optimal.
Proof. Given a known optimal value V * given by πE we assume for the sake of contradiction there also exists an alternative policyπE = πE that gives a memoryM t−dt = M t−dt and for whichV * t−dt > V * t−dt . To recover the known optimal memory Mt we liftM t−dt to Mt = f (M t−dt , st). This impliesV * > V * which in turn contradicts the purported original optimality of V * and thereforê πE.
Bellman solution. Armed with optimal substructure of M we want to do the next natural thing and find a recursive Bellman solution to maximize our value function for F (Eq. 1). (A Bellman solution of F is also a solution for E (Eq.2). We do this in the classic way by breaking up the series for F into an initial value F0, and the remaining series in the summation. We can then apply this same decomposition recursively (Eq 3) to arrive at a final "twp-step" or recursive form which is shown Eq. 7). (Mt+2) , . . .
[7]
A greedy policy explores exhaustively. To prevent any sort of sampling bias, we need our exploration policy πE (Eq.3) to visit each state s in the space S. As our policy for E is a greedy policy, proofs for exploration are really sorting problems. That is if a state is to be visited it must have highest value. So if every state must be visited (which is what we need to prove to avoid bias) then under a greedy policy every state's value must, at one time or another, be the maximum value. We assume implicitly here the action policy πE can visit all possible states in S. If for some reason πE can only visit a subset of S, then the following proofs apply only to exploration of that subset.
To begin our proof, some notation. Let Z be the set of all visited states, where Z0 is the empty set {} and Z is built iteratively over a path P , such that Zt+ = {s|s ∈ P and s ∈ Zt}. As sorting requires ranking, we also need to formalize ranking. To do this we take an algebraic approach, are define inequality for any three real numbers (a, b, c) (Eq. 8). 
To complete the proof, assume that some policyπE = π * E . By definition policyπE can be any action but the maximum, leaving k − 1 options. Eventually as t → T the only possible swap is between the max option and the kth, but as we have already proven this is impossible as long as Axiom 5 holds. Therefore, the policyπE will leave at least 1 option unexplored and S = Z. Theorem 3 (State search: depth). Assuming a deterministic transition function Λ, a greedy policy πE will resample S to convergence at Et ≤ η.
Proof. Recall: Axiom 5.
Each time π * E visits a state s, so M → M , F (M , a t+dt ) < F (M, at)
In Theorem 2 we proved only a deterministic greedy policy will visit each state in S over T trials.
Optimality of ππ. In the following section we prove two things about the optimality of ππ. First, if πR and/or πE had any optimal asymptotic property for value learning before their inclusion into our scheduler, they retain that optimal property under ππ. Second, we use this Theorem to show if both πR and πE are greedy, and ππ is greedy, then Eq 5 is certain to maximize total value. This is analogous to the classic activity selection problem (45) .
Independent policy convergence.
Theorem 4 (Independence policy convergence under ππ). Assuming an infinite time horizon, if πE is optimal and πR is optimal, then ππ is also optimal in the same senses as πE and πR.
Proof. The optimality of ππ can be seen by direct inspection. If p(R = 1) < 1 and we have an infinite horizon, then πE will have a unbounded number of trials meaning the optimally of P * holds. Likewise, E < η as T → ∞, ensuring piR will dominate ππ therefore πR will asymptotically converge to optimal behavior.
In proving this optimality of ππ we limit the probability of a positive reward to less than one, denoted by p(Rt = 1) < 1. Without this constraint the reward policy πR would always dominate ππ when rewards are certain. While this might be useful in some circumstances, from the point of view πE it is extremely suboptimal. The model would never explore. Limiting p(Rt = 1) < 1 is reasonable constraint, as rewards in the real world are rarely certain. A more naturalistic to handle this edge case is to introduce reward satiety, or a model physiological homeostasis (63, 64) .
Optimal scheduling for dual value learning problems. In classic scheduling problems the value of any job is known ahead of time (18, 45) . In our setting, this is not true. Reward value is generated by the environment, after taking an action. In a similar vein, information value can only be calculated after observing a new state. Yet Eq. 5 must make decisions before taking an action. If we had a perfect model of the environment, then we could predict these future values accurately with model-based control. In the general case though we don't what environment to expect, let alone having a perfect model of it. As result, we make a worst-case assumption: the environment can arbitrarily change-bifurcate-at any time. This is, it is a highly nonlinear dynamical system (76) . In such systems, myopic control-using only the most recent value to predict the next value-is known to be an robust and efficient form of control (49) . We therefore assume that last value is the best predictor of the next value, and use this assumption along with Theorem 4 to complete a trivial proof that Eq. 5 maximizes total value. Optimal total value. If we prove ππ has optimal substructure, then using the same replacement argument (45) as in Theorem 4, a greedy policy for ππ will maximize total value. Theorem 5 (Total value maximization of ππ). ππ must have an optimal substructure. Proof. Recall: Reinforcement learning algorithms are embedded in Markov Decisions space, which by definition have optimal substructure.
Recall: The memory M has optimal substructure (Theorem 1.
Recall: The asymptotic behavior of πR and πE are independent under ππ (Theorem 4
If both πR and πE have optimal substructure, and are asymptotically independent, then ππ must also have optimal substructure.
P R E P R I N T

Supplementary materials.
Dual value implementation.
Value initialization and tie breaking. The initial value E0 for π * E can be arbitrary, with the limit E0 > 0. In theory E0 does not change π * E 's long term behavior, but different values will change the algorithm's short-term dynamics and so might be quite important in practice. By definition a pure greedy policy, like π * E , cannot handle ties. There is simply no mathematical way to rank equal values. Theorems 3 and 2 ensure that any tie breaking strategy is valid, however, like the choice of E0, tie breaking can strongly affect the transient dynamics. Viable tie breaking strategies taken from experimental work include, "take the closest option", "repeat the last option", or "take the option with the highest marginal likelihood". We do suggest the tie breaking scheme is deterministic, which maintains the determinism of the whole theory. See Information value learning section below for concrete examples both these choices.
The rates of exploration and exploitation. In Theorem 4 we proved that ππ inherits the optimality of policies for both exploration πE and exploitation πR over infinite time. However this does proof does not say whether ππ will not alter the rate of convergence of each policy. By design, it does alter the rate of each, favoring πR. As you can see in Eq. ??, whenever rt = 1 then πR dominates that turn. Therefore the more likely p(r = 1), the more likely πR will have control. This doesn't of course change the eventual convergence of πE, just delays it in direct proportion to the average rate of reward. In total, these dynamics mean that in the common case where rewards are sparse but reliable, exploration is favored and can converge more quickly. As exploration converges, so does the optimal solution to maximizing rewards.
Re-exploration. The world often changes. Or in formal parlance, the world is non-stationary process. When the world does change, re-exploration becomes necessary. Tuning the size of in ππ (Eq ??) tunes the threshold for re-exploration. That is, once the π * E has converged and so π * R fully dominates ππ, if is small then small changes in the world will allow piE to exert control. If instead is large, then large changes in the world are needed. That is, acts a hyper-parameter controlling how quickly rewarding behavior will dominate, and easy it is to let exploratory behavior resurface.
Bandits.
Design. Like the slot machines which inspired them, each bandit returns a reward according to a predetermined probability. As an agent can only chose one bandit ("arm") at a time, so it must decide whether to explore and exploit with each trial.
We study four prototypical bandits. The first has a single winning arm (p(R) = 0.8, Figure 2A ); denoted as bandit I. We expect any learning agent to be able to consistently solve this task. Bandit II has two winning arms. One of these (arm 7, p(R) = 0.8) though higher payout than the other (arm 3, p(R) = 0.6). The second arm can act as a "distractor" leading an to settle on this suboptimal choice. Bandit III also has a single winning arm, but the overall probability of receiving any reward is very low (p(R) = 0.02 for the winning arm, p(R) = 0.01 for all others). Sparse rewards problems like these are difficult to solve and are common feature of both the real world, and artificial environments like Go, chess, and class Atari video games (50) (51) (52) . The fourth bandit (IV) has 121 arms, and a complex randomly generated reward structure. Bandits of this type and size are probably at the limit of human performance (53) .
World model and distance. All bandits share a simple basic common structure. The have a set of n-arms, each of which delivers rewards in a probabilistic fashion. This lends itself to simple discrete n-dimensional world model, with a memory slot for each arm/dimension. Each slot then represents the independent probability of receiving a reward (Supp. Fig 4A) .
The Kullback-Leibler divergence (KL) is a widely used information theory metric, which measures the information gained by replacing one distribution with another. It is highly versatile and widely used in machine learning (? ), Bayesian reasoning (23, 29) , visual neuroscience (29) , experimental design (77) , compression (78? ) and information geometry (79) , to name a few examples. KL has seen extensive use in reinforcement learning.
The Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence satisfies all five value axioms (Eq. 10).
Itti and Baladi (29) developed an approach similar to ours for visual attention, where our information value is identical to their Bayesian surprise. Itti and Baladi (2009) showed that compared to range of other theoretical alternative, information value most strongly correlates with eye movements made when humans look at natural images. Again in a Bayesian context, KL plays a key role in guiding active inference, a mode of theory where the dogmatic central aim of neural systems is make decisions which minimize free energy (14, 23) .
Let E represent value of information, such that E := KL(M t+dt , Mt) (Eq. 10) after observing some state s. To make Axiom 5 more concrete, in Figure 5 we show how KL changes between a hypothetical initial distribution (always shown in grey) and a "learned" distribution (colored). For simplicity's sake we use a simple discrete distribution representing a 10-armed bandit, though the illustrated patterns hold true for any pair of appropriate distributions. In Figure 5C we see KL increases substantially more for a local exchange of probability compared to an even global re-normalization (compare panels A. and B.).
Initializing ππ. In these simulations we assume that at the start of learning an animal should have a uniform prior over the possible actions A ∈ R K . Thus p(a k ) = 1/K for all a k ∈ A. We transform this uniform prior into the appropriate units for our KL-based E using Shannon entropy, E0 = K p(a k ) log p(a k ).
In our simulations we use a tie breaking "right next" heuristic which keeps track of past breaks, and in a round robin fashion iterates rightward over the action space. for the current trial, and α is the learning rate (0 − 1]. See the Hyperparameter optimization section for information on how α chosen for each agent and bandit.
V (s) = V (s) + α(Rt − V (s) [11] The return Rt differed between agents. Our dual value agent, and both the variations of the e-greedy algorithm, used the reward from the environment Rt as the return. This value was binary. The Bayesian reward agent used a combination of information value and reward Rt = Rt + βEt, with the weight β tuned as described below.
Hyperparameter optimization. The hyperparameters for each agent were tuned independently for each bandit using a modified version of Hyperband (80) . For a description of hyperparameters seen Table 1 , and for the values themselves Table ? ?.
Exploration and value dynamics. . While agents earned nearly equivalent total reward in Bandit I (Fig 3, top row) , their exploration strategies were quite distinct. In Supp. Fig 6B-D) we compare three prototypical examples of exploration, for each major class of agent: ours, Bayesian, and E-greedy for Bandit I. In Supp. Fig 6A) we include an example of value learning value learning in our agent. Bandit. Note how the search is structured, and initially sequential. C-D. Exploration dynamics for two other agents. C. The Bayesian agent, which like our algorithm uses active sampling, and values information. Note how this shows a mixture of structures and repeated choices, mixed with seemingly random behavior. D. The E-greedy agent, which uses purely random sampling. Note how here the agent is either greedy, repeating the same arm, or seemingly random.
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